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Abstract: A simple model evaluating a firm’s optimal employment reaction to an imminent
recession is presented. Firing costs shelter employment – and this effect is typically amplified
by  uncertainty  due  to  an  option  value  of  waiting.  However,  this  job  protection  effect  is
reduced if the expected probability of a setback increases, and if the expected duration and
size of a recession grows. If a severe recession is expected with a high probability the option
to  wait  with firing  looses  its  value,  thus,  immediate  layoffs  and  market  exits  become  the
optimal strategy even before the recession turns out to be actual.
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Firing versus Continuing Employment if an Economic Setback is Expected
1. Introduction
Firing costs shelter employment even when continuing employment causes losses, because
firing  is  more  costly  than  continuing  employment.  In  a  stochastic  environment  this
employment protection effect of sunk firing costs is amplified by uncertainty due to an option
value  of  waiting  (BENTOLILA & BERTOLA  [1990],  BENTOLILA & SAINT PAUL  [1999],
CHEN & ZOEGA  [1999]).  Due  to  stochastic  profit  variations,  in  case  of  an  unfavourable
realisation  future  profits  may  turn  out  to  be  negative,  which  would  make  firing  optimal.
However, there is a chance that future profits may turn out to be more favourable – in that
case continuing employment would be better. For that realisation of actual future profits a
firm which has fired to early will regret to have paid the sunk firing costs. If a firm has the
option to wait with firing and to postpone the layoffs, it will prefer to wait for a while to
become  sure  about  future  profits.  Thus,  even  sizeable  current  losses  may  not  result  in
immediate  layoffs.  However,  this  employment  protection  is  reduced  if  the  chance  of  a
favourable profit development decreases or, correspondingly, if the expected probability of an
economic setback increases. Furthermore, waiting with a market exit in spite of current losses
becomes more unattractive, if the expected duration and size of a probable setback increases.
A severe looming recession which is expected with a high probability, devalues the option to
wait with firing, and immediate layoffs and market exits become the optimal strategy even
before the recession turns out to be actual. In this paper (in contrast to the literature cited
above) a very simple model based on standard discrete financial mathematics is applied. The
focus of  this  simple  model  is  to  formally  describe the  negative  effects  of  changes  in  the
expected probability of a severe imminent recession on the employment strategy of a firm.
2. A simple model
A risk neutral firm is assumed, maximising the expected present value of its activities. If the
firm in the present (t = 0) is active and employs a staff it receives the profit e. If this current
profit  e  is  negative  the  firm  has  to  decide  about  a  market  exit,  which  simultaneously  is
associated with firing the staff. If a recession actually takes place, the profit will even be lower
during  this  setback:  (e – u).  A  firm  which  fires  its  staff  can  avoid  these  high  losses.  The
expectation of a recession can be the last straw that leads to a stop of unprofitable activities.
However, there is a chance that no recession will occur; in this case the profit e remains
unchanged. Moreover, layoffs can only be done if sunk firing costs F (e.g. severance pay) are
paid. An overview of the time structure of the payments for different cases is given in Tab. 1.M. Göcke: Firing versus Continuing Employment if an Economic Setback is Expected 2
Tab. 1: Time distribution of payments with or without an economic setback







end of plan 
ning horizon
period t = 0 t = 1 ... t = n t = n + 1 ... t = N
payments without
recession (no exit) e e ... e e ... e
payments if
immediate exit – F        
payments if recession,
but no exit in t=1 e e – u ... e – u e ... e
payments if recession,
and with exit in t=1 e – F      
with e : firm’s profit (without recession) n : duration of recession ( n ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ 1 )
u : decline of profit during recession ( u ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ 0 ) N : total planning horizon ( N ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ n )
F : sunk firing costs ( F ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ 0 )
C is the probability of a recession (“crisis”, “crash”, ”cycle”) in the next period t = 1, thus, the
probability of the non appearance of a setback is (1 – C). The interest rate is i, and δ is the
respective discount factor. The expected present value of continuing activity and employment
without considering an option to exit/fire in next period (t = 1), after the setback actually has
begun, is:
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i ⋅ (1 + i)n
         = 
e ⋅ [1 – δ(1+N)] – C ⋅ u ⋅ [δ – δ(1+n)]
1 – δ
with  C : probability of a recession in next period t = 1  ( 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ C ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ 1 )
i : interest rate  ( i ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ 0 )   ⇔    δ ≡ 
1
1 + i  : discount factor ( δ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ 1 )
The expected present value of an immediate exit in t = 0 is determined by the negative firing
costs: ( – F). If no option to wait with firing is considered, a current profit e that triggers an
immediate exit can be calculated by the indifference between immediate exit and permanently
continuing activity:
(2) EPV0 = ( – F)     ⇔     eexit
no opt = 
C ⋅ u ⋅ [δ – δ(1+n)] – (1 – δ) ⋅ F
1 – δ(1+N)
⇔   exit in t = 0 if:   e < eexit
no opt   ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ 0
Notice that we assume the absence of moral hazard effects; i.e. the firm (or its owner) is able
and is forced to finance the firing costs F.M. Göcke: Firing versus Continuing Employment if an Economic Setback is Expected 3
The expected present value of waiting until the setback actually will take place – or not – is
calculated: If a setback actually will happen in t = 1, the firm will use the option to exit/fire
and must bear the firing costs F. If no recession occurs the firm continues market activity and
employment. The setback and exit has the probability C and, correspondingly,  continuing
activity and employment has the probability (1 – C). Waiting with the firing decision until the
crash/crisis in t = 1 will actually happen (or not) has a probability weighted expected present
value EPVwait.
(3) If recession, exit in t = 1:    PV(exit in t=1) = e – 
F
1 + i  =  e – δ ⋅ F
if no setback, no exit:    PV(no exit) = 




i ⋅ (1 + i)N  =  
e ⋅ [1 – δ(1+N)]
1 – δ
⇒   EPVwait = C ⋅ (e – δ ⋅ F) + (1 – C) ⋅ 
e ⋅ [1 – δ(1+N)]
1 – δ
Indifference between waiting and an immediate exit in t = 0 with a present value of ( – F)
results in an exit threshold of the profit e if a waiting strategy is feasible:
(4) EPVwait = ( – F)     ⇔     eexit
opt  = 
 – F ⋅ (1 – δ) ⋅ (1 – C ⋅ δ)
1 –  C ⋅ δ – (1 –  C) ⋅ δ(1+N)   ≤ 0
⇔   immediate exit in t = 0 if:   e < eexit
opt    ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ 0
Notice, the trigger profit eexit
opt  does not rely on the absolute size u of the stochastic shock, but
only on its probability C, because an exit avoids bearing these losses of (u – e). However, as
we  will  see  below,  the  range  of  present  profits  e,  where  this  waiting trigger  is  relevant,
depends on the size of u. The waiting strategy is only relevant if in t = 1 an exit will be an
optimal reaction to the recession. Thus, in case of an actual setback firing must be cheaper
than  bearing  expected  transient  losses  during  the  recession  with  a  length  of  n  periods.
Indifference between firing and employment in t = 1 in case of a setback is given if:
(5)
– F
1 + i = 
e – u
i  – 
e – u
i ⋅ (1 + i)n + 
e
i ⋅ (1 + i)n – 
e
i ⋅ (1 + i)N
⇔     ( – F) = 
(1 – δN) ⋅ e – (1 – δn) ⋅ u
1 – δ
⇔   eexit
t=1  = 
(1 – δn) ⋅ u – (1 – δ) ⋅ F
1 – δN
⇔   exit in t = 1 in case of a setback if profit in t = 0:   e < eexit
t=1
Thus, a waiting strategy is optimal if the present profit e meets the following condition:
(6) Waiting in t = 0 (with option to exit in t = 1) if:   e < eexit
t=1    ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧   e > eexit
opt
⇔   exit/firing in t = 0 if:   e < eexit
t=1    ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧   e < eexit
optM. Göcke: Firing versus Continuing Employment if an Economic Setback is Expected 4
If even in the case of a setback an exit in t = 1 is not rational, the firm decides whether to
withstand the whole recession period and to bear transient losses rather than to exit/fire:
(7) Endure the recession (no exit expected) if:   e > eexit
t=1    ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧   e > eexit
no opt
⇔   immediate exit/firing in t=0 if:   e > eexit
t=1    ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧   e < eexit
no opt
The  intersection  between  these  two  different  “non firing” cases  is  given  by  indifference
between both expected present values, for the cases with and without the option to wait for a
potential exit in t = 1:
(8) eexit
opt  = eexit
no opt    ⇔    EPVwait = EPV0    ⇔  (solving for e)   e = eexit
t=1
Hence, the threshold eexit
t=1  for a rational exit in the next period t = 1 exactly represents the
intersection resp. the borderline between the “waiting”  and the “enduring” strategy. Thus, the
firm will immediately exit/fire in t = 0 if neither waiting nor enduring is reasonable:
(9) eexit = min( eexit
opt  , eexit
no opt )  ≤ 0
⇔   immediate exit/firing in t = 0 if:   e < eexit
In order to give an intuition of the “mechanics” of the model, some special cases are explicitly
discussed. If, e.g., no recession is expected at all (C = 0), both immediate exit triggers are the
same:
(10) C = 0:   eexit(C=0) = eexit
opt  = eexit
no opt  =  
 – F ⋅ (1 – δ)
1 – δ(1+N)    ≤ 0
If, in contrast, the firm is sure that a setback will take place in the next period (C = 1), the
waiting/option trigger eexit
opt  is determined by the interest payment on the firing costs. I.e. if the
(negative) annuity due of the current profit e is below the negative firing costs ( – F), the firm
will  prefer  an  immediate  exit  relative  to  the  option  to  postpone  exit  until  next  period.
However,  the  relevant  alternatives  may  not  be  “immediate  exit  versus  wait  and  see”  but
“immediate exit versus weather the market cycle”, if the enduring trigger is even lower than
the waiting trigger. This will be the case if the expected recession is not “severe” enough; i.e.,
if the absolute size of the shock u is small, or/and if the duration of the recession n is not too
long. In such a situation, even if the recession will actually take place in the next period, an
exit in t = 1 will not be an optimal reaction.
(11) C = 1:   eexit(C=1)
opt  = (1 – δ) ⋅ ( – F)  =  
– i ⋅ F
1 + i  =  i ⋅ δ ⋅ (– F)   ≤ 0
    and   eexit(C=1)
no opt  =  
u ⋅ [δ – δ(1+n)] – (1 – δ) ⋅ F
1 – δ(1+N)
     ⇒   eexit(C=1) = min( eexit(C=1)
opt  , eexit(C=1)
no opt
 )
The firm considers an immediate exit, if the profit is negative (e ≤ 0). If the planning horizon
N is very long and the negative profit is expected for the very long future, and if these lossesM. Göcke: Firing versus Continuing Employment if an Economic Setback is Expected 5
will be even higher during a recession, the enduring strategy looses relevance. Thus, for a firm
with an infinite planning horizon (N → ∞), the waiting trigger is the relevant one. Of course, if
the  firm  expects  a  setback  with  an  infinite  duration  (n → ∞)  the  enduring strategy  is  not
relevant. In both cases the immediate exit trigger is determined by the interest payment on the
firing costs F:
(12) N → ∞:   eexit(N→∞)
opt  = (1 – δ) ⋅ ( – F)   and   eexit(N→∞)
no opt   =  C ⋅ u ⋅ [δ – δ(1+n)] – (1 – δ) ⋅ F
        ⇒   eexit(N→∞) = eexit(N→∞)
opt  = (δ – 1) ⋅ F    ≤ 0
(13) n → ∞:   eexit(n→∞)
opt  = (1 – δ) ⋅ ( – F)   and   eexit(n→∞)
no opt   =  C ⋅ u ⋅ δ – (1 – δ) ⋅ F
        ⇒   eexit(n→∞) = eexit
opt  = (δ – 1) ⋅ F   ≤ 0
3. Simulation exercise
The following figures illustrate the effects of the absolute magnitude of the setback u, the
duration n and the probability C of an expected recession on the current profit eexit which
triggers an immediate exit  of  a  firm  including  firing  of  its  employees.  For  the  numerical
calculations the firing costs F are normalized to F = 1. The planning horizon of the firm is set
to N = 4 periods and the interest rate is i = 0.1. The existence of firing costs safeguards the
jobs. If, e.g., no recession is expected (C = 0) the profit per period which triggers a market exit
must be below e = (– 0.24), which is about a quarter of the total firing costs (F = 1). However
this sheltering effect is reduced, if a recession is expected with a higher probability (i.e. with a
high C), if the recession is expected to be long (i.e. a large n), and if the negative shock is
sizeable (i.e. a large u). These effects are graphically illustrated below.
Fig. 1: Immediate exit triggers of the present profit e and the probability of a recession C
for a different expected duration n of the recession;
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Fig. 1 shows the effects of an increase in the perceived probability of a future recession (with
a magnitude of u = 0.2) on the willingness to fire immediately in the present period t = 0. The
curve crossing the points B,D,E,F shows the waiting threshold eexit
opt  (if the firm has a valuable
option to fire in next period). However, this trigger is only relevant if firing in t = 1 is rational
in case of an appearance of a recession; otherwise the enduring trigger eexit
no opt is relevant. For a
very short one period recession (n = 1), the waiting trigger is relevant in the range of a very
low crash probability C between points B and D. For higher probabilities C the enduring 
trigger eexitֽn=1
no opt  determines the profit, below which an immediate exit is profitable for the firm
and above which enduring this short (n = 1) recession is the reasonable alternative. In contrast,
for a setback which is expected to have a longer duration (n = 3), the waiting trigger is relevant
in the wider range between points B and F, and the enduring trigger eexitֽn=3
no opt  is only relevant
for high crash probabilities C (right hand side of point F, combined with low losses triggering
an immediate exit). The positive slope of the (B,D,E,F) curve for eexit
opt  indicates that the more
probable the expected setback, the weaker is the safeguard effect against firing. Furthermore,
the expected duration n has an effect on the range where this curve is relevant, since the
longer the expected duration of the setback, the less attractive is the enduring strategy. This is
illustrated by the shift of the “kink” between both strategies from point D (for n = 1), to point
E (for n = 2) and F (n = 3). For n = 4, the enduring strategy is not relevant at all. The effect of
an increase in the probability of a setback C is indicated by the positive slope of the eexit
opt  
curve. The convexity of this curve indicates that especially changes in the high C level area
(i.e. if the expected crash probability changes from “almost sure” to “absolutely sure”) have
the heaviest effect on weakening the job protection of the firing costs. This is because in this
area  the  amplification  effect  of  the  firing  payment  F  due  to  an  option  value  of  waiting
diminishes vigorously.
Fig. 2: Immediate exit triggers of the profit e and the probability of a recession C
for a different absolute size u of the setback;













































Fig. 2 shows a very similar pattern, though now not the duration n but the absolute size u of
the setback is changed (while the duration of the recession is fixed n = 2). Again the waiting 
strategy is illustrated by the eexit
opt  curve (with points B,G,H,K). The position of the “kink” M. Göcke: Firing versus Continuing Employment if an Economic Setback is Expected 7
points indicating the switch to the enduring strategy trigger eexit
no opt, depends on the size u of
the setback. For u = 0 actually no setback is expected (independent from C), thus, eexitֽu=0
no opt
(point B) is effective. If the expected size of the setback increases to u = 0.1, the waiting 
trigger is valid in the range between points B and G. For a situation with a large expected size
of the shock u = 0.3, the waiting trigger is effective in the range between points B and K. The
“kink” in point K indicates the switch of the relevant strategy to enduring. Again, the more
severe the expected setback (now in term of the absolute size u, in contrast to Fig. 1 where the
duration n was addressed), the lower is the job sheltering effect of the firing costs. And again,
due to the convex slope of the eexit
opt  curve, especially changes to near certainty (with a high C)
about the appearance of a recession in the next period have this weakening effect.
4. Conclusion
A very simple model based on standard mathematics of annuities was applied in order to
illustrate  the  decision  of  a  firm  with  respect  to  firing  versus  continuing  employment.  An
option value of waiting based on sunk firing costs typically results in a firm’s reluctance to
fire  workers.  This  reluctance  is  even  strengthened  by  uncertainty,  since  in  an  uncertain
situation there is a chance of a better future, when early firing may later on turn out to be the
wrong decision. However, a rise in the expected probability of an economic setback devalues
the option value of waiting. Moreover, two different cases of continuing employment were
addressed. If only a weak recession with a low magnitude and/or a short duration is expected,
“weathering the market cycle” is the relevant alternative to firing. In this “enduring strategy”
case even the actual future appearance of a weak recession will not result in layoffs. However,
if the firm faces a severe imminent recession with a high expected magnitude and/or a long
duration, continuing employment is merely based on a “waiting strategy”. Now firing will
only be postponed and not abandoned if the recession will really start later on. The firing
thresholds  of  the  present  profits  are  calculated  for  different  expectations  concerning  the
probability and the severity (magnitude and duration) of the economic crisis. Especially a rise
in the probability that a looming severe recession really will come about, heavily weakens the
employment protection effect of firing costs, and will induce immediate firing even before the
recession becomes effective.
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